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Th e  l a m e n t a b l e  s t o r y  o f Worthington Force is  well 
known. During the second phase 
of Operation Totalize a battlegroup 
formed by the tanks of the British 
Columbia Regiment and the infantry 
of the Algonquin Regiment was 
ordered to capture a piece of high 
ground known as Point 195. In the 
pre-dawn darkness of 9 August 1944 
the battlegroup set out on its mission. 
Rather than capturing Point 195, 
they found themselves on a different 
piece of high ground, near Point 140, 
some six kilometres northeast of their 
objective. Soon after daybreak the 
battlegroup was heavily attacked by 
German units in the area. Lieutenant-
Colonel D.G. Worthington, the 
commanding officer of the BCRs 
and the overall commander of the 
force, made the fateful decision to 
stay put and await reinforcements. 
Unfortunately, nobody came to their 
rescue. Though small bodies of troops 
were able to escape, Worthington 
Force was destroyed losing 240 men 
killed, wounded and captured, 47 
tanks and numerous other armoured 
vehicles and half-tracks.
 The odyssey of Worthington 
Force is one of the great enigmas of 
the Normandy campaign. In their 
advance to Point 140 the battlegroup 
crashed through the last major German 
defensive line, effectively opening 
the way to Falaise. Reinforcing this 
breakthrough with additional troops 
might have caused the entire German 
front north of Falaise to collapse. 
But nobody knew where to find 
Worthington Force. Communications 
with the battlegroup were lost before 
noon on 9 August and the limited 
attempts to find it were focussed on 
the vicinity of Point 195. Intermittent 
radio communications between the 
battlegroup and rear elements were 
made during the course of the day 
as were contacts with elements of 
the Polish Armoured Division, the 
artillery and aircraft of 2nd Tactical 
Air Force but the location of the 
battlegroup was never relayed to HQ 
4th Canadian Armoured Brigade 
(4th CAB).
 How did Worthington Force 
get lost? C.P. Stacey, the official 
historian of the Canadian army, 
speculated “it seems clear that the 
regiment, fighting its first battle, 
and advancing across country with 
few landmarks and dealing with 
scattered opposition as it did so, 
simply lost its way.”1 After setting 
out for Point 195 in the early morning 
hours of 9 August the battlegroup 
encountered enemy fire diverting it 
from its intended route. As dawn 
broke high ground, assumed to be 
their destination, was sighted directly 
ahead. Stacey surmised that the 
battlegroup mistook a straight section 
of the road running from Estrées-la-
Campagne to Mazières for the main 
Caen-Falaise highway. After crossing 
this road the battlegroup found 
a defensible position on the high 
ground and dug in. The battlegroup 
was repeatedly attacked by German 
forces until early evening when the 
position was finally overun ending 
the desperate battle. How could this 
happen? That a battlegroup could get 
lost and ultimately destroyed before 
reinforcements could arrive was 
unprecedented in Normandy, and 
perhaps in the course of the Second 
World War. The closest example was 
the destruction of elements of the 
British 22nd Armoured Brigade at 
Villers-Bocage on 13 June 1944, but 
it was never lost and its casualties 
were much lower than those of 
Worthington Force.2 
 Until now this was our best 
understanding of the destruction 
of the battlegroup. Recently, new 
photographic evidence has emerged. 
Abstract: The standard account of 
Worthington Force is well known – on 9 
August 1944 during Operation Totalize 
a battlegroup formed by the tanks of 
the British Columbia Regiment and 
the infantry of the Algonquin Regiment 
was ordered to capture Point 195. 
Unbeknownst to anyone, including 
the men of Worthington Force, the 
battlegroup lost its way in the dark 
and found itself on a different piece of 
high ground, near Point 140, some six 
kilometres northeast of their objective. 
Cut off from any support, Worthington 
Force was destroyed by concerted 
German attacks over the course of the 
day. Based on new archival research and 
an examination of contemporary aerial 
photographs, this article will show how 
the battlegroup lost its way as well as 
reveal that the battlegroup was not as 
out of touch as previous accounts have 
indicated.
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6The Laurier Centre for Military 
Strategic and Disarmament Studies 
possesses a collection of Second 
World War aerial reconnaissance 
photographs. Among the hundreds 
of boxes of images are a number 
containing images taken on 9 August 
1944. A careful examination of these 
photographs reveals a great deal 
about the odyssey of Worthington 
Force.  The entire path of  the 
battlegroup can be traced, from the 
time it left its harbour north of 
Cintheaux until its final arrival 
southeast of Estrées-la-Campagne. 
The air photos reveal information 
about the route of the battlegroup, 
the resistance it encountered along 
the way, locations where tanks 
and vehicles were destroyed and 
evidence regarding German reactions 
to the breakthrough of the Canadian 
force. Most importantly, the air 
photos provide evidence to support 
a new hypothesis about how the 
battlegroup got lost. This article will 
re-examine the events of 9 August 
1944 which culminated with the 
destruction of Worthington Force and 
provide a better understanding of 
why and how things went so terribly 
wrong.
* * * * *
Operation Totalize, launched late on 7 August 1944, was a major 
armoured offensive designed to break 
through the German positions south 
of Caen and open the way to Falaise. 
At 2300 hours 1,020 Lancasters and 
Halifaxes of RAF Bomber Command 
commenced dropping 3,462 tons 
of bombs to open the attack. The 
ground attack started 30 minutes 
later. The first phase of Totalize was 
remarkably successful. The attack 
did not go exactly as planned but 
in less than 24 hours the infantry of 
the 2nd Canadian and 51st Highland 
Divisions, supported by the 2nd 
Canadian and 33rd British Armoured 
Brigades, had pushed more than 
nine kilometres into the German 
defences.3
 The momentum of the attack 
was to be maintained in the second 
phase of Totalize by committing 4th 
Canadian and 1st Polish Armoured 
Divisions. Again the attack was 
to be led by heavy bombers, this 
time supplied by the US Eighth Air 
Force. The bombing started at 1226 
hours on 8 August and was largely 
accurate, hitting three of four targets 
(Bretteville-sur-Laize, St. Sylvain and 
Hautmesnil/Cauvicourt) with good 
concentrations while a fourth target 
(Gouvix) could not be identified. 
Unfortunately a number of American 
aircraft dropped their bombs short 
hitting Canadian and Polish troops 
causing over 350 casualties (including 
more than 65 men killed). This friendly 
bombing caused serious difficulties 
in the rear area, and to the Polish 
Armoured Division in particular, 
but it did not prevent 4th Canadian 
Armoured Division (4th CAD) from 
starting their attack on time. The 10th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade, led by the 
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 
of Canada, captured the villages of 
Cintheaux and Hautmesnil by last 
light. Renewed German resistance, 
however, prevented the expected 
breakout. Lieutenant-General Guy 
Simonds, the commander of 2nd 
Canadian Corps, was not satisfied 
with this progress and during the 
course of the day was constantly 
urging the armour to move faster.4
 The disappointing pace on 
8 August led Simonds to order 
his armoured units to continue 
advancing in the dark. However, 
night operations for tanks are difficult 
and Canadian and Polish armoured 
units generally halted operations 
and withdrew to harbours to await 
dawn.5 The lack of a breakout also 
forced a reshuffling of assignments 
for the next day. Halpenny Force, 
composed of the Canadian Grenadier 
Guards (CGG) and the Lake Superior 
Regiment, was originally tasked 
to capture Point 195. The control 
of this high ground was seen as 
essential for any advance to Falaise. 
However, Halpenny Force had been 
unable to advance past Hautmesnil 
on 8 August. Brigadier E.L. Booth, 
commander of the 4th CAB, now 
ordered Halpenny Force to capture 
the village of Bretteville-le-Rabet 
while a fresh formation - Worthington 
Force – was ordered to reach Point 
195 by first light. The stage was 
now set for the dramatic events of 9 
August 1944.6
* * * * *
Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Worthington 
was the commanding officer of the 
British Columbia Regiment. He was 
considered by Major-General George 
Kitching, the commander of 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division, to be “the 
outstanding regimental commander 
in the armoured brigade…he was the 
youngest, full of energy and quick to 
seize an opportunity.”
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7The Breakthough
For the Algonquin Regiment, the first day of operations was one of 
slow advances and great monotony. 
The men boarded armoured half-
tracks in Vaucelles (just south of 
Caen) before midnight on 7 August 
shortly before the column headed 
south. By dawn, the column had 
advanced three kilometres and halted 
north of Ifs. They remained in this 
location most of the day and it was 
here the unit witnessed American 
bombers hit targets behind them. 
Major L.C. Monk, the commander 
of “B” Company, recalled, “What 
a situation, to see your own people 
bombed by your own people, without 
being able to do anything about it...It 
was a grim thing to witness just before 
going into battle.”7 Fortunately, the 
Algonquins escaped being hit by the 
bombs and their advance continued 
at 1700 hours. The column slowly 
passed through Rocquancourt which 
was still being cleared by Canadian 
infantry before pulling into a harbour 
with the British Columbia Regiment 
(BCR) just as it was getting dark. The 
experience of the BCRs that day was 
similar. The unit began its advance at 
0130 hours and its move was equally 
slow due to the difficulty of moving 
an armoured column at night. No 
casualties were sustained during 
this advance, unlike the Governor 
General’s Foot Guard which lost two 
tanks to mine strikes. At last light, 
the BCRs pulled into a laager north 
of Cintheaux where it “blackhorsed 
in an open field.”8
 Just before midnight on 8 August, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Worthington was 
called to the brigade orders group (O 
Group). Brigadier Booth outlined the 
new plan. The Poles would not be able 
to move that night and the advance 
was to be led by Grenadier Guards 
and BCR battlegroups. The normally 
upbeat Worthington left the O Group 
dismayed. The BCR’s intelligence 
officer, Lieutentant J.T. Jenkinson, 
recorded, “As we left the conference, 
Col. Worthington commented quietly 
and off the record about the changes 
in the original plan. He recounted 
the Principles of War and how so 
many of them had been violated 
and that we would need luck if we 
were to, ‘bring it off.’”9 By the time 
that Worthington returned to hold 
his own regimental orders group at 
0130 hours he was determined to be 
positive. Worthington briefed the 
officers of the BCRs and Algonquins 
on the new plan. Major J.H. Carson, 
officer commanding “B” Squadron, 
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Sherman tanks and other vehicles of the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade await the order to move, 8 August 1944.
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8recalled that Worthington expected 
“merely a few second rate German 
formations holding feature 195 
and vicinity.”10 Major Monk was 
also present during this briefing 
and remembered the orders “as 
something like this”:
The attacks have gone well today. 
The enemy is disorganized - the 
higher command intend to take 
advantage of the situation and 
push on.
The Polish Division will be 
operating on our left. We will 
likely be beyond our artillery 
support, but may have some air 
co-operation. The Algonquin 
Regiment is under command. The 
Brigadier’s intention is to seize the 
high ground feature, spot height 
195...
My intention is to seize and hold 
this feature until the rest of our 
troops can reach us.
Method - we will move out of 
this harbour, cross the highway 
at MR (guess 080547) about 300 
yards south of where we are now, 
pass through the Lake Superiors 
who are dug in at this point, 
advance south on the east side of 
the highway, taking advantage 
of ground until opposite the 
objective, then recross the highway 
and assault the hill from the south-
east.
The tanks will do the fighting 
on the way down. Keep moving; 
try to reach the objective before 
daylight.11
 The column left its harbour south 
of Lorguichon at about 0230 hours in 
the pre-dawn darkness of 9 August 
1944. Progress was slow as the column 
received constant, though largely 
inconsequential, German machine 
gun fire. By about 0400 hours the 
column reached Cintheaux. The lead 
formation, “C” Squadron, was forced 
to halt for 15-30 minutes to deal with 
this opposition emanating from a tree 
line extending east of Cintheaux. This 
was eventually neutralized as was 
machine gun fire emanating from the 
church in Cauvicourt.12 More serious 
resistance was encountered a little 
farther south in the triangle formed 
by the quarry south of Hautmesnil, 
Bretteville-le-Rabet and Cauvicourt. 
The terrain the battlegroup was 
passing over was heavily scarred 
by the American bombing of the 
previous day but this does not seem 
to have seriously affected German 
defences in this area. There was a 
German gun position containing four 
88 mm dual purpose anti-aircraft 
guns and six smaller-calibre anti-
aircraft guns in an open field on the 
north edge of Bretteville-le-Rabet.13 
This position contributed to the 
“intense and accurate flak” which 
destroyed nine American bombers 
during the attacks of the previous 
day.14 As the lead tanks of the column 
passed between Hautmesnil and 
Cavicourt they took fire from the 
south, likely from this German 
position. It was here that the seeds 
of the disaster were sown.
 Lieutenant-Colonel Worthington 
was faced with a tough decision. His 
orders were clear - Simonds wanted 
his battlegroup entrenched on Point 
195 by daybreak. The direct route 
to his objective was not available 
to him. Bretteville-le-Rabet was 
still held in some strength. The 
village was supposed to have been 
cleared by Halpenny Force but it had 
started late and its lead squadron 
was arriving at the same time as 
Worthington Force. As the BCR war 
diary recorded, “it was undecided 
for a moment or two whether we 
should wait for them to clear the town 
or not. Then the CO gave the order 
‘Move on anyway, while we still 
have surprise.’”15 There was a great 
deal of confusion. In order to keep 
moving the battlegroup maneuvered 
east to avoid German fire to their 
front and the CGG to their right. It 
was a clear night but the moon was 
only in its first quarter and did not 
provide much light for navigation. 
Visibility was further degraded by an 
early morning ground fog as well as 
the dust generated by the armoured 
A line of 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
Sherman tanks head south on the Caen-Falaise 
highway on the afternoon of 8 August 1944.
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9vehicles.16 Crossing the bomb-
cratered wheatfields the battlegroup 
came upon a wide straight road. In 
France, where narrow, twisted roads 
were the norm, this, they believed, 
could only be the Caen-Falaise 
highway. The lead elements of the 
battlegroup immediately turned 90 
degrees to their right and increased 
speed to follow the road which would 
lead them to their objective. Their 
navigation was confirmed as the first 
glimmers of sun began to appear 
in the east. As the BCR war diary 
related: “High ground was sighted 
and we headed for it.”17 
 U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e  r o a d 
discovered by the battlegroup was 
not the main highway. The Chemin 
Haussé du duc Guillaume (the 
raised road of Duke William) was 
indeed wide and straight at the 
point where it was crossed by the 
battlegroup, but it did not lead to 
Point 195. This ancient road had been 
ordered constructed by William the 
Conqueror to mark the route of his 
escape from the vicinity of Valognes 
through the intervening territory 
to Bayeux and then on to Falaise. 
A straight section from Laize-la-
Ville (east of the Orne River) to just 
west Rouvre was still in existence in 
1944, nearly nine centuries after its 
construction.18
 Aerial reconnaissance photos 
taken mid-morning on 9 August 
clearly show the route taken by 
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Top: Captain Lyle Monk watches 
Corporal Jack Richmond demonstrate 
the handling of a Sten gun at the 
Algonquin Regiment’s barracks in 
England, 22 November 1943. Monk 
would subsequently be promoted major 
commanding “B” Company.
Middle: Major Tommy Baron (second 
from right),  officer commanding  
“C” Squadron of the BCRs, poses with 
his tank crew before the battle.
Bottom: Officers of the British Columbia 
Regiment. In the front row (from left 
to right) are Major Baron, Major G.R. 
Sidenius, the “A” Squadron commander, 
Colonel Whyte and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Worthington.
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10
Worthington Force. The battlegroup 
initially followed the Caen-Falaise 
highway, but soon left the highway 
and continued their advance south 
parallel to the highway. Just south 
of Cintheaux the battlegroup headed 
to the southeast and passed west of 
Cauvicourt. After passing the village 
it briefly moved south. At this point 
it began to take fire from German 
positions north of Bretteville-le-
Rabet. Wheeling to the left (due 
east) to avoid the enemy gunscreen 
it travelled about half a kilometre 
before crossing the Chemin Haussé. 
The fog of war now took over. In the 
confusion of battle and with poor 
visibility the lead elements of the BCR 
lost track of their position. When they 
crossed the wide, straight section of 
the Chemin Haussé they must have 
Top: This oblique aerial photograph, taken on 26 July 1944, shows the intended route of 
Worthington Force as a solid line. When the battlegroup approached Bretteville-le-Rabet 
they discovered that the village was still being cleared by Halpenny Force so Lieutenant-
Colonel Worthington made the decision to skirt the village and continue on to Point 
195 (dashed line). The dotted line shows the direction the battlegroup actually took.
Above: This oblique aerial photograph, also taken on 26 July 1944, shows the actual 
route taken by Worthington Force. The position where they ended up is just visible in 
the top left corner of the photo.
Opposite: This aerial photograph, taken on 9 August 1944, contains the evidence 
which shows how Worthington Force got lost. The prominent straight road starting at 
the top left corner and extending to the centre of the photo is the Chemin Haussé du 
duc Guillaume. The tracks in the field made by Worthington Force show that as the 
battlegroup move south, roughly parallel to the Caen-Falaise highway (just off the photo 
to the left) it moved west where it encountered the Chemin Haussé. After crossing this 
wide, straight road the battlegroup immediately wheeled to the right and continued 
to follow this road all the way to its final position near Hill 111. It is believed that in 
the confusion of the early morning battle, with visibility obscured by smoke, mist and 
dust, this road was mistaken for the Caen-Falaise highway.
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assumed they had stumbled upon 
the Caen-Falaise highway. After 
crossing the road they immediately 
turned to the right and followed this 
road to what they thought was their 
objective. In fact the Chemin Haussé 
led straight to their destruction.19 
From the narrow vision slits of 
their tanks and in the gloom of the 
early morning the terrain fit what 
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they expected to find. They were 
following a straight road which they 
intended to cross on their right and 
find a height of land which was their 
objective. This description fits both 
their intended route to Point 195 and 
their actual route to Point 140.
 The rapid pace of the advance and 
the concealment provided by the half 
light of dawn allowed the vanguard 
of the battlegroup to proceed with 
limited German intervention. The 
Sherman tanks of the BCRs led the 
way firing at any potential targets 
along the way. The BCR war diary 
remarked that some haystacks 
exploded when fired upon while 
machine gun bullets ricocheted off 
other haystacks. South of Cauvicourt 
the lead tanks passed through a small 
wood containing enemy troops. “As 
we approached…we sighted enemy 
soft skin vehicles, armoured cars, and 
half-tracks. These were duly shot up 
as we proceeded and many of the 
enemy were killed.”20
 The Regimental Headquarters 
(RHQ) and “C” Squadron of the 
BCRs did not stop until they reached 
the high ground shortly before 
0650 hours. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Worthington made the decision to 
create a fortress position inside a 
rectangular field on a piece of high 
ground that offered good visibility 
of the surrounding countryside. At 
0650 hours Worthington reported to 
HQ 4th CAB that they had arrived 
at Point 195, “No evidence of enemy 
occupation - but recent signs. Few 
lorries destroyed, slit trenches and 
tools about. We are holding until our 
friends come fwd to consolidate.”21 
At this point nobody knew that 
Worthington Force was far removed 
from its objective. In fact,  the 
battlegroup was 2000 metres due east 
of Estrées-la-Campagne near Point 
111,22 and over 6000 metres northeast 
of Point 195. Neither Worthington 
nor Brigadier Booth knew that the 
battlegroup was lost. This had two 
deadly consequences. There would 
be no reinforcements, and even 
more importantly, there would be 
no protection or support from the 
artillery.
 During the advance to the 
objective the battlegroup became 
spread out. As dawn broke, “B” 
Squadron of the BCRs, lagging 
behind the vanguard, stopped north 
of Estrées-la-Campagne to check 
their location. After consulting his 
map Major J.H. Carson, the squadron 
commander, realized the battlegroup 
was in the wrong place. He was in 
the process of reorienting his force to 
advance to Point 195, and had already 
despatched his No.2 Troop to the 
correct objective, when he received 
a radio order from Worthington to 
“advance to high ground in front.” 
Carson had no choice but to join the 
rest of the battlegroup.23 During this 
pause the two lead companies of the 
Algonquins, “B” and “C,” were able 
to catch up with Carson’s squadron. 
Major Monk deployed 10 Platoon to 
check out Estrées, but they quickly 
returned and reported the village 
to be unoccupied. By the time his 
men had returned from their recce 
the tanks along with “C” Company 
had disappeared over the hill so 
Monk followed their tracks. Upon 
arrival at Point 111 he realized that 
10 Platoon was missing so after 
reporting to Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. 
Hay, the commanding officer of the 
Algonquins, he set out to find his 
missing men:
By the time I reached them, they had 
all but annihilated a German gun 
position consisting of about 30 all 
ranks, 2 88 mm guns and about 10 
motorcycles. The platoon which had 
been trailing the rest of the company 
by about 200 yards, had been fired at 
by this German position. Lieutenant 
Clare Dutcher, 10 Platoon commander, 
without hesitation, changed the course 
of his two vehicles, and rushed the 
position headlong, debusing on top 
of the Germans. They killed all but 
five who were taken prisoner. The 
motorcycles and guns were put out 
of action. The German prisoners were 
terrified, and with good reason since 
in the excitement of the moment, 
the bayonet had been freely used. 
This whole episode took less than 15 
minutes.24
The aerial photographs taken on 9 August  1944 capture the tragedy of Worthington Force. This image shows the area 
immediately to the west of their final position. A number of burning vehicles can be seen. The two on the left centre of 
the image almost certainly belong to “A” Squadron which was almost entirely destroyed before reaching the rectangular 
wood. The white smoke emanating from the tree line below the road at the top centre of the photo is most likely a German 
position that has been destroyed by the battlegroup while it is impossible to tell the identity of the vehicles on the road.
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After neutralizing this position 
10 Platoon joined the rest of the 
battlegroup on the objective.
 Not al l  the subunits  from 
Worthington Force made it to Point 
111. “A” Squadron of the BCRs along 
with “D” Company of the Algonquins 
were last in the order of march. Upon 
reaching the vicinity of Estrées-
la-Campagne the Shermans came 
under fire from an enemy force. By 
this time the tanks had lost the cover 
of darkness. What followed was a 
daylight, close quarter battle with 
an enemy armoured force supported 
by anti-tank guns. The outcome 
was never in doubt. “A” Squadron 
was annihilated.25 Lieutenant John 
Stock, commander of No.4 Troop, 
“B” Squadron, was still making his 
way forward as “A” 
Squadron was being 
destroyed. He recalls:
We suddenly saw that 
A Squadron, which was 
slightly off to our left, 
were having a tough 
time of it. These were 
the first Shermans that 
we had actually seen 
destroyed in battle. We 
had seen many films 
of the 8th Army in 
action in Africa, with 
smoke slowly curling 
out of the turrets on 
knocked out tanks, but 
not so with Shermans. 
When a Sherman was 
hit by anti-tank fire, 
particularly from the 
88, there seems to be an 
immediate explosion 
and flames roared 20 
or 30 feet out of the 
top of the turret. This 
was followed by two of 
three explosions of high 
octane gas and the high 
explosive shells and 
the ammunition racks 
exploding. As I watched 
through binoculars, the 
first tank that I saw hit was that 
of Captain Ray Tiffen, the Battle 
Captain of A Squadron. What I 
described suddenly happened and 
his whole tank became a roaring 
torch of flame. Most of the rest of the 
squadron followed suit.26
Though the squadron claimed the 
destruction of two Tiger tanks and 
an anti-tank gun, as many as 17 
Shermans from the squadron were 
destroyed. Only two tanks from “A” 
Squadron were able to break through 
and join up with the regiment.27
 The men of the Algonquins’ 
“D” Company could only watch 
helplessly while this was taking 
place. Major G.R. Sidenius, the “A” 
Squadron commander, ordered 
Major A.K.J. Stirling, the commander 
of “D” Company, to hold back until 
his tanks had cleared the way. When 
Stirling realized what was happening 
to the tanks he tried to take his 
company forward, but was unable to 
move due to heavy mortar, tank, anti-
tank and machine gun fire directed 
at his men. After trying without luck 
to contact the rest of the regiment 
Stirling withdrew his men to a hill 
overlooking Bretteville-le-Rabet. 
Stirling sent a fighting patrol into the 
town where they linked up with the 
Lake Superior Regiment who were 
clearing the town. After committing 
his company to complete this task 
Stirling was ordered late in the day 
to St. Hillaire Farm north of Point 195 
which they captured without a fight. 
They were joined here early on 10 
August by the remaining elements 
of the battalion. Neither “A” or “D” 
Companies of the Algonquins were 
able to join the rest of the battalion 
at Point 111.28
* * * * *
The Fight on the Hill
The calm which surrounded the arrival of the battlegroup at Point 
111 belied the firestorm that was soon 
to be unleashed. Worthington had 
established his troops on a defensible 
piece of high ground that he thought 
to be (or be near) Point 195. His 
position was in a rectangular field 
300 yards long by 100 yards wide. 
It offered good visibility and fields 
of fire over the surrounding terrain. 
It also provide some protection as 
it was bounded on the south by a 
wooded area, to the west by a broken 
hedge and small thicket, to the north 
by a thin line of tall trees and to the 
east by stubble fields.29 Worthington 
had ample time to establish his 
defensive positions, but he did 
not know that he had stirred up a 
hornet’s nest. The German reaction 
to this penetration of their line was 
swift and unmerciful. The Canadian 
This rectangular wood is the final position of Worthington 
Force. This air photograph, taken on the morning of 9 August 
1944, allows us to see the Sherman tanks of the British 
Columbia Regiment arrayed around the perimeter of the field. 
Worthington’s tank and command post are visible around the 
tree near the centre of the position. The small white squares 
and the white line in the position are air recognition panels 
displayed to prevent attacks by friendly aircraft.
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and British attacks at the start of 
Operation Totalize the previous day 
had penetrated the main German 
line of resistance and smashed the 
89th Infantry Division. The night 
of 8/9 August was spent trying to 
piece together a new line to hold the 
Allied advance. The 12th SS Hitler 
Youth Panzer Division, commanded 
by SS-Oberführer Kurt Meyer was 
now holding the line. By this point 
in the Normandy Campaign the 
12th SS was a shadow of its former 
self having been heavily mauled, 
primarily by the Canadians, over 
the previous two months. However, 
it was still a formidable force. Meyer 
redeployed his forces to prevent a 
breakthrough to Falaise. The heights 
north of Mazières and Rouvres were 
covered by Kampfgruppe Krause; 
from Point 140 to the Caen-Falaise 
highway north of Quesnay were 
held by Kampfgruppe Wallmüller; 
Point 195 and its approaches was 
held by the 3rd Battalion, 26th Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment along with 
stragglers from 89th Division. The 
tanks of the division, along with 501st 
SS Tiger Battalion, were positioned 
in Quesnay Woods.30 The depth 
of the advance by Worthington 
Force was first discovered by SS-
Obersturmführer Bernhard-Georg 
Meitzel who had been sent from 
Quesnay Woods to Point 140 to 
located Kampfgruppe Waldmüller. 
As he approached Point 140 his 
light armoured car was fired on 
by the lead tanks of the BCRs who 
were already in the area. Meitzel’s 
vehicle was not hit and he was 
able to return to Quesnay Woods. 
Upon receiving Meitzel’s report SS-
Obersturmbannführer Max Wünsche 
immediately organized his tanks to 
launch an attack on the Canadian 
position lest they establish a firm hold 
on the ground.31
 Worthington calmly organized 
his defences. Command of the tanks 
was delegated to Major T.B. Baron, 
officer commanding “C” Squadron. 
At this point in the day he had 
available 31 Shermans and one 
light recce tank.32 The tanks were 
positioned around the perimeter of 
the field, interspersed with the half-
tracks which had carried the infantry. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Hay similarly 
deployed his infantry. “C” Company 
was placed along the southeast and 
southwest edges of the wood while 
“B” Company covered the northern 
portions. The 3-inch mortars of the 
mortar platoon were situated in the 
southwest corner of the wood. “D” 
Company was tasked to cover the 
northwest and southwest edges of 
the wood, but it never arrived. The 
infantry were not bothered as they 
prepared their positions, but they 
found it very difficult to dig trenches 
in the hard gravel fields.33
 After reporting back to Wünsche, 
Meitzel returned to the area seeking 
to obtain more information on the 
Canadians’ intentions. A shell from 
a Sherman tank destroyed Meitzel’s 
armoured car and he was thrown 
from the turret, breaking his arm in 
the process. He was quickly made a 
prisoner by a Canadian tank crew.34
 Worthington Force did not come 
under serious fire until about 0800 
hours, over an hour after their arrival. 
In their advance to Point 111 the 
Canadians had passed through 
elements of Kampfgruppe Krause 
which had been ordered to take up 
new defensive positions exactly where 
Worthington Force now sat. The 
result was a sporadic and disjointed 
initial response to the Canadian 
battlegroup. Harassing fire targeted 
the Canadians from a small wood 
(referred to on modern topographic 
maps as 30 Acres Wood) located on a 
piece of higher ground 700 metres to 
the south. At the same time fire was 
also directed at the Canadians from 
the northeast. The tanks deployed 
around the perimeter of the field at 
Point 111 returned fire, but with no 
definite targets their response was 
ineffective. Worthington attempted 
to eliminate this fire. One troop of 
tanks was sent to the north but it 
was knocked out by fire from unseen 
German guns soon after leaving the 
battlegroup position. At 0900 hours a 
second force, composed of two troops 
from “B” Squadron, was send out to 
capture 30 Acres Wood.35 Lieutenant 
John Stock’s No.4 Troop (down to 
two tanks) led the way to the wood 
while Lieutenant John Scudamore’s 
No.3 Troop provided covering fire 
and smoke. Despite heavy fire Stock 
and his troop sergeant made it to 
the copse where they discovered 
a network of enemy bunkers and 
trenches. He was in the process of 
firing high explosive shells into the 
position when his tank came under 
fire. The first shot, fired by a Tiger 
tank, narrowly missed and hit a large 
tree next to the Sherman. The German 
gunner did not miss the second time 
as he put his shot through the front 
right sponson of Stock’s Sherman, 
killing the co-driver and igniting the 
fuel and ammunition. The resulting 
explosion blew the rest of the crew, 
including Stock, out of the tank. 
Subsequent shots knocked out the 
tank of Sergeant George Wallbank. 
Major Carson and his battle captain, 
Johnny Hope, also had their tanks 
destroyed as they moved forward 
to join Stock. Aerial photographs 
taken mid-morning on 9 August pay 
mute testament to this engagement 
showing the burning hulks of the 
Canadian tanks beside the wood.36
 After the tanks were destroyed 
Major Carson led some of the 
survivors into the wood where they 
“annihilated one enemy section of 
infantry.”37 Back at the main position 
Worthington watched the destruction 
of his tanks and made arrangements 
to rescue the survivors. He told 
Lieutenant Jenkinson to take a half-
track to bring back the wounded. The 
driver assigned to the mission did not 
think much of the task, answering, 
“who me?” when told he was to drive 
the carrier. 
 Before the carrier arrived Stock 
helped to get his remaining members 
of his crew back to the battlegroup 
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at Point 111. Along the way he came 
across Sergeant Wallbank:
I found him stretched on the ground 
moaning, with one foot completely 
blown off and the boot lying about 
four feet from the stump with a long 
piece of achilles tendon still attached. 
George had always been a great 
athlete and he always stated that he 
would rather get it completely than 
lose a limb. He was staring down at 
the stump of his leg and looked up 
at me and said, “You still have your 
pistol, kill me.” I tried to assure him 
that all would be well and reached 
in my battle dress for a morphine 
syrette…After a few minutes George 
relaxed a bit from the effects of the 
morphine.38
Stock was in no shape to help 
Wallbank to safety. Indeed when he 
arrived back at the main position he 
needed immediate first aid to deal 
with his painful burns. Jenkinson 
remembered that Stock was virtually 
unrecognizable due to the swelling of 
his face. In spite of the German fire 
the half-track made it to the survivors 
and Lieutenant Jenkinson helped to 
administer first aid to those in need. 
A series of German near-misses 
showered the group with dirt and 
shrapnel and injured a number of 
men including Lieutenant Jenkinson. 
The half-track driver took a number 
of wounded men back to the main 
group leaving the rest to crawl back, 
including Jenkinson and Sergeant 
Wallbank who was missing a foot.39 
They were able to make it back on 
their own.
 By 0930 hours all the survivors 
had returned to the position. The 
entire affair at 30 Acre Wood had 
lasted only 30 minutes.
 The first major counterattack 
on the Canadian position was made 
at about 1000 hours. It came as 
something of a relief to the men 
defending the position as German 
mortar fire on the position was 
suspended during the attack and the 
men finally had something concrete 
at which to shoot. Major Carson 
estimated that this attack was made 
by about 200 infantry and four 
tanks. It was defeated with heavy 
casualties.40 The Germans made 
numerous attempts during the course 
of the day to break into the Canadian 
position, but each attempt was 
repelled, often with heavy German 
losses.
 Soon after the battlegroup 
defeated the first major German 
counterattack, Worthington held 
an improvised orders group at his 
tank near the centre of the position. 
Present were Worthington, Hay, 
Stock, and Major W.S. Macpherson, 
commander of  “C” Company, 
along with his company sergeant-
major, A.J. Primeau. As the men 
were talking a German armour-
piercing round struck the side of 
Worthington’s command tank. CSM 
Primeau was killed in the blast and 
a fragment struck Hay severing 
his leg. A tourniquet was placed 
on Hay’s leg to stop the bleeding. 
Macpherson assumed command 
of the Algonquins even though his 
back was filled with sharpnel as a 
result of the same shell.41 Major Monk 
estimated that by late morning over 
half the tanks that made it to Point 
111 had been destroyed.
 About noon Worthington ordered 
the remaining half tracks to collect the 
wounded and make a “mad dash to 
safety.” The vehicles were loaded 
with Lieutenant-Colonel Hay, Major 
Carson, and Lieutenants Stock and 
Jenkinson, among others. The half-
tracks displayed prominent red 
crosses, but were still fired on as they 
ran the gauntlet to safety. At least two 
of the six carriers, and perhaps more, 
made it to Allied lines.42
 While the fight was taking place 
at 30 Acres Wood the battlegroup still 
had no clear idea of its true location. At 
0748 hours HQ 4th CAB radioed the 
BCRs requesting their position. The 
reply came seven minutes later that 
they were on their objective at Point 
195. An hour later another request for 
a location check received the same 
answer. This was the last recorded 
message between HQ 4th CAB and 
Worthington Force.43 Major-General 
George Kitching, commander of 4th 
CAD, and Brigadier Booth became 
“deeply disturbed” by the silence 
coming from Worthington Force. 
Most of the chatter recorded in the 4th 
CAB radio log on 9 August related 
to their attempts to get information 
on the location of the missing 
battlegroup. The first attempt to find 
Worthington Force was made at 0914 
hours when the Governor General’s 
Foot Guard (GGFG) were ordered 
to proceed to Point 195. Though 
urged repeatedly to get moving, the 
GGFG did not start forward until 
late afternoon when they completed 
the clearance of Bretteville-le-Rabet. 
A great deal of effort was expended 
to locate the missing battlegroup but 
nobody thought to look outside the 
immediate vicinity of Point 195.
 A clear indication of this comes 
from the reaction of Major-General 
Kitching. He stated in his memoirs 
that he thought the battlegroup had 
overshot its objective and ended 
up further south in the vicinity of 
Potigny. Brigadier J.N. Lane, the 
commander Royal Artillery of 4th 
CAD, set off in his personal Auster 
aircraft to search for the battlegroup. 
This remarkable air photo captures 
the battle in progress during the early 
afternoon of 9 August 1944. The half-
tracks have departed the battlegroup 
position to carry the wounded to 
safety but the results of the morning’s 
engagements are still evident. To the 
north of the rectangular field are the 
burning Shermans that Worthington 
sent out to deal with German fire coming 
from that direction (See 1). At the 
bottom of the photo is 30 Acre Wood 
and the still burning Shermans of Major 
Carson, Captain Hope, Lieutenant Stock 
and Sergeant Wallbank (See 2). All the 
tracks in the fields south and east of 
30 Acre Wood belong to enemy forces. 
At least one German tank has been 
captured in this photo (See 3).
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In 1945 members of the British Columbia Regiment returned 
to the rectangular field near Point 111 and found many of 
their Shermans still sitting where they had been destroyed on 
9 August 1944.
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Though he could 
not cross over the 
front line, he flew 
straight down the 
main highway until 
he could see Falaise. 
T h e  l o c a t i o n  o f 
Worthington Force 
would have been 
clearly visible to him 
at the height he was 
flying and its exact 
position would have 
been obvious with 
the thick columns 
o f  b l a c k  s m o k e 
emanating from the 
knocked out Shermans. However, if 
he did see them he must have believed 
the tanks belonged to the Poles and 
was not the missing battlegroup.44
 The apparent radio silence from 
Worthington Force was caused by 
the deteriorating fortunes of the now 
trapped battlegroup. The arrival 
of two surviving tanks from “A” 
Squadron brought the unwelcome 
news that their approach route 
was now closed. The destruction 
of the tanks at 30 Acres Wood 
signalled the arrival of the German 
armour sent by Wünsche to deal 
with the battlegroup. According the 
Kurt Meyer’s memoirs, Wünsche 
despatched five Tigers directly from 
Quesnay Wood to attack Point 140 
from the west while sending a second 
group of 15 Panthers around to attack 
from the east. The 
Panthers would act 
as the hammer to 
the Tigers’ anvil.45
 The battlegroup 
was out of touch 
with  the  higher 
e c h e l o n s  o f 
command during 
most of the day, 
b u t  t h e r e  w e r e 
numerous contacts 
with Allied units 
during the course 
o f  the  day  that 
held the tantalizing 
opportunity of finding the lost 
battlegroup. The first Allied troops 
contacted by the casualties who were 
evacuated was Lieutenant J.E. Brooks 
of the reconnaissance troop. He had 
been ordered to hold near Bretteville-
le-Rabet. Brooks’ after-action report 
notes that he talked to Lieutenant 
Stock who “gave me a message 
from the CO [Worthington] to the 
effect that the regiment could hold 
the position with some assistance 
and also that their position was in 
Square 0947.”46 Unfortunately, this 
map reference placed the battlegroup 
just north of Point 195 and nearly six 
kilometres from their actual location. 
The communications difficulties did 
not end there as Brooks was unable 
to contact brigade headquarters and 
instead passed the message on to 
somebody in the CGG who were still 
fighting in Bretteville-le-Rabet. There 
is no record that the CGG relayed this 
message back to brigade. 
 Though Worthington was unable 
to contact brigade headquarters, 
he was in contact with his supply 
echelon during the course of the day. 
At 1100 hours Regimental Sergeant-
Major Jay, the officer commanding 
the Admin Report Centre, received a 
message from Worthington to bring 
forward the reserve of ammunition. 
His attempt was prevented by heavy 
German fire which destroyed at least 
one of his vehicles, a Crusader anti-
aircraft tank. Jay contacted elements 
of the Polish Armoured Division 
who were operating in the area, 
but their attempt to deal with the 
German resistance also resulted in 
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the loss of a number of Polish tanks. 
Jay stated, “The air conditions [radio 
reception] was very bad and I had 
trouble getting through to my unit. 
I last heard from the CO at 1415 
hours, but spoke to his operator 
several times until 1500 hours then 
all communications were lost to us. 
I then tried to contact Brigade on 
the Q link but could not get through 
to them.”47 Though it is unknown 
if Worthington was ever able to 
communicate the battlegroup’s true 
location to RSM Jay, it is of great note 
that he was in regular contact with 
him for most of the day and none of 
these messages were received at, or 
forwarded, to brigade.
 The battlegroup received regular 
support throughout the day from 
the Royal Air Force. According to 
Major Monk, two Hawker Typhoons 
appeared over the Canadians “fairly 
early in the morning.” After circling 
the position the aircraft attacked the 
battlegroup with rockets and cannon 
fire. The RAF pilots would have been 
thrilled to find such a target - dozens 
of tanks and other vehicles in the 
open beyond the bombline on which 
they had been briefed. As it was 
in an area where no Allied forces 
were known, or supposed to be, the 
pilots attacked. The Canadians were 
quick to get out recognition signals 
which were acknowledged by the 
aircraft overhead. The recognition 
panels are clearly visible in the aerial 
reconnaissance photos taken before 
noon. What is not clear is why word 
of the battlegroup’s location was 
not relayed to army headquarters. 
The RAF continued to support the 
battlegroup throughout the day. It 
must be questioned why there was 
no communication between the RAF 
and army headquarters. Would the 
RAF not report the presence of a 
substantial and unexpected Allied 
force beyond the bombline? And 
if such a report was made, would 
the army not make every effort 
to determine the identity of this 
force? But, this did not happen. 
The RAF returned at regular half-
hour intervals and attacked German 
positions all around Point 111 where 
they were “heartily cheered many 
times during the day.”48 On one 
particular occasion “C” Company 
of the Algonquins saw “the enemy 
mustering on the high ground to 
the south [in the vicinity of 30 Acres 
Wood]. However, the Typhoons 
arrived back and strafed the enemy 
who were caught in the open and 
suffered heavily.”49 Lieutenant Ken 
Gartley, the officer commanding 
11 Platoon, “B” Company of the 
Algonquins, also praised the air 
support:
Our rocket-firing Typhoons…gave 
us good support by silencing the 
enemy guns. However in their 
absence we were suffering heavy 
casualties from the mortar and arty 
fire which surrounded us.50 
Kurt Meyer was dismissive of the role 
of air power during the battle stating 
that even though his tanks were out 
in the open and “looked like targets 
on a range,” the Typhoons ignored 
his men and directed their attack 
against the Canadian positions.51 
Meyer records only the one air attack 
and it is likely that he is describing 
only the initial appearance of the RAF 
on the battlefield and not any of their 
subsequent attacks.
 The battlegroup received limited 
support during the afternoon from 
the 1st Polish Armoured Division as it 
advanced south from St. Sylvain. Like 
the RAF, they too initially fired on 
the Canadians but once recognition 
smoke was released the friendly 
fire stopped. The Poles attempted 
to drive forward to support the 
Canadians. Approximately 1500 
metres from the battlegroup the 
Germans recognized the threat posed 
by the Poles and began to concentrate 
their fire on them. This provided a 
temporary, but desperately welcome, 
relief for the Canadians. A further 
advance brought the Poles within 
300 metres of the Canadian position 
where they broke up a German 
formation massing to attack the 
battlegroup. Despite their attempts 
to move forward the Poles sustained 
serious losses and were forced to 
withdraw without making direct 
contact with the battlegroup. By 
late afternoon there was no further 
support provided by the Poles and 
intense German fire once again was 
directed at the Canadians.52 
 Another avenue of contact for the 
battlegroup was through the artillery 
net. Captain M.A. Baker of the 
19th Field Regiment was one of the 
forward observation officers (FOOs) 
assigned to the battlegroup. He was 
in radio contact with his regiment 
throughout the day, and as late as 
1830 hours he reported, “enemy 
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attacking with heavy mortaring.”53 
Lieutenant Ken Gartley recalls that 
about noon one of the forward 
observation officers, possibly Baker, 
contacted an artillery command post 
in the rear. The battery fired three 
rounds of smoke, but it fell some 
1800 metres short.54 This intriguing 
information indicates that someone 
in the Canadian lines was aware of 
the location of Worthington Force, 
but the information was not shared 
with anyone who could intervene.
 In spite of all these outside 
contacts, the battlegroup was unable 
to relay their location to anyone 
with the ability to intervene in their 
situation.
* * * * *
Late in the afternoon, perhaps around 1500 or 1530 hours, 
Worthington took stock of their 
situation. He realized that his 
remaining infantry were well 
entrenched and he made the decision 
to evacuate his remaining tanks. At 
this point only eight tanks of his 
original 55-60 that had started the 
advance were still mobile. These 
Shermans broke out of the position 
and all but one were able to link up 
with Polish forces. A liaison officer 
with the Poles reported this event to 
HQ 4th CAB at 1500 hours but this 
information does not appear to have 
provided Booth or Kitching with any 
information upon which they could 
act.55 
 One of the most remarkable 
aspects of this drama is that the 
battlegroup had repeated contacts 
with Allied forces during the course 
of 9 August, but this did not generate 
intelligence that allowed 4th CAB to 
positively influence the battle. The 
RAF was aware of the location of the 
battlegroup as were the Poles, radio 
contact had been made with RSM Jay 
and at least one artillery unit, and 
two separate groups had escaped 
(the half-tracks with the wounded 
at noon and the eight tanks later in 
the day) and run the gauntlet back 
to Allied lines. Also, “D” Company 
of the Algonquins never made it to 
Hill 111 but they had advanced far 
enough forward to know the general 
direction taken by the battlegroup. 
Somehow none of this information 
made it to anyone who could send 
support for the lost men.
 By late afternoon it was clear the 
end was near for the battlegroup. 
Worthington held out hope that relief 
was imminent and intended to fight 
to the finish. He had maintained his 
cool all day long, calmly directing the 
battle. He emerged unscathed from 
the shell that killed CSM Primeau 
and severely wounded Lieutenant-
Colonel Hay in the morning, one of 
his many close calls during the day. 
His luck ran out at approximately 
1730 hours.  Worthington was 
dealing with yet another German 
counterattack and had just visited 
the Algonquin mortar platoon 
when a mortar bomb landed at his 
feet killing him instantly.56 Major 
Macpherson assumed command of 
the battlegroup. He agreed with Major 
Monk to attempt the extrication of the 
survivors once darkness fell. German 
pressure on the position continued 
to constrict the perimeter, bringing 
infantry and armour within a couple 
hundred metres of the Canadian 
battlegroup. Lieutenant Gartley was 
there at the end:
At last light the Germans started 
to line up an attack to wipe out the 
remainder of the attacking force 
that had moved in so boldly that 
morning. The first information of this 
was in C Coy area when we heard 
machine gun and rifle fire; thence the 
roars of a tank and the shouting of 
infantry. Almost simultaneously we 
hear shouting to our rear as another 
force was moving in from east to 
west along the dead ground…Lt. 
Blais had the fwd pl in C Coy and 
was taken prisoner along with his 
men when they were overrun.57
As the Germans swarmed into the 
position, small groups of men made 
their escape as best they could. Some 
reached Allied lines that night while 
others returned with harrowing tales 
after many nights on the run.
 Worthington Force fought 
gallantly,  but the battlegroup 
was destroyed and losses were 
catastrophic. The BCRs, in their first 
battle, lost 47 tanks (44 Shermans, 2 
Stuarts, 1 Crusader) and suffered 112 
casualties (40 killed, 38 wounded and 
34 prisoners of war). Over two days, 
9 and 10 August, the Algonquins 
suffered 128 casualties (45 men killed 
or died of wounds, 38 wounded 
and 45 prisoners of war). The vast 
majority of these would undoubtably 
have come from the two companies at 
Point 111. Stacey’s opinion resonates 
well: “Such losses would have been 
deeply regrettable even had they been 
the price of success. Unfortunately, 
they were suffered in the course of 
a tactical reverse which did much to 
prevent us from seizing a strategical 
opportunity of the first magnitude.”58
* * * * *
The Dénouement
Lo n g  a f t e r  t h e  b a t t l e  h a d finished, aerial reconnaissance 
photographs have given us a look 
back in time. Stacey’s explanation 
that the battlegroup mistook the east-
west road at Estrées-la-Campagne 
for the north-south Caen-Falaise 
highway does not make sense. The 
battlegroup was already off course 
by the time it had advanced that far 
south. The error in navigation was 
made much earlier. Stacey was right 
that the battlegroup followed the 
wrong road, but it was the Chemin 
Haussé south of Cauvicourt that 
they misidentified. It was close to the 
Caen-Falaise highway. It was wide 
and straight where the battlegroup 
picked it up, and in the darkness, 
dust, smoke, chaos and confusion 
of the unit’s first battle, it appeared 
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to go in the correct direction. To 
complete the perfect deception, as 
the first shadows of doubt crept 
into the minds of those leading the 
battlegroup, dawn broke over the 
battlefield revealing a tantalizing 
piece of high ground directly in 
front of them. It could only be their 
objective. Worthington ordered the 
battlegroup to make for the heights 
as quickly as possible so as not to 
lose the element of surprise. Though 
the Canadians arrived at the wrong 
location and missing some of its 
elements, it was still a formidable 
entity, entrenched on favourable 
ground of its own choosing. The 
bold advance by the battlegroup had 
stolen the initiative from the Germans 
and forced the enemy to take steps to 
react to the Canadian breakthrough. 
The fatal problem on 9 August was 
not the navigation error, but the 
inability of the Canadian command 
and control system to react to the 
unexpected event and turn a negative 
into a positive.
 Ar t i l l e ry  suppor t  for  the 
battlegroup completely failed on 9 
August 1944. Three units – 19th and 
23rd Field Regiments, and the British 
11th Medium Regiment, along with 
a FOO from each regiment – were 
allocated to support the battlegroup. 
It was clear from the start, however, 
that the field regiments would not be 
able to support the initial moves of 
the battlegroup. As the battlegroup 
moved off prior to dawn, only the 
British medium regiment was in a 
position to provide artillery support. 
The two Canadian field regiments 
spent the afternoon and evening of 
8 August located south of the village 
of Rocquancourt. These units were 
not ordered forward until dawn on 
9 August. The maximum range of 
the Sexton’s 25-pounder gun meant 
that it was incapable of supporting 
the battlegroup upon its arrival at 
Point 195.59 At 0500 hours 23rd Field 
Regiment was ordered to a new 
gun position south of Cintheaux. 
Unfortunately, in the words of the 
unit’s history, “The regiment pulled 
a boner.” The regiment’s adjutant 
incorrectly deciphered the new map 
coordinates and the unit ended up 
over three kilometres northwest of 
their assigned position. This mistake 
took the regiment out of the battle 
for most of the day and they did not 
arrive at their new position between 
Hautmesnil and Urville until late 
afternoon.60 The 19th Field Regiment 
also remained out of the battle until 
mid-afternoon. It was not ordered 
forward until 1230 hours and only 
reported ready for action southwest 
of Cintheaux at 1420 hours. Captain 
M.A. Baker, the 19th Field FOO, 
was in contact with his regiment 
for most of the day. At 1250 hours, 
just as the unit was commencing 
its move forward, Baker reported 
that he was being heavily shelled. 
At 1700 hours he reported that the 
enemy was forming for an attack, 
and 90 minutes later contact with 
Baker was lost after he reported that 
the enemy was attacking supported 
by heavy mortaring.61 No where is 
it recorded what, if any, artillery 
support was provided to Baker 
by his regiment. There are many 
unanswered questions here. Did 
Baker have continuous contact with 
his regiment during the course of the 
day, or do the recorded messages 
represent the only contacts he was 
able to make? By the afternoon of the 
9th Baker should have been aware 
that he was not at Point 195. Why was 
this information not conveyed to his 
regiment? Or, if it was, why was it 
not shared with brigade or divisional 
headquarters?62
 The difficulties of the field 
regiments meant that 11th Medium 
Regiment was the only possible 
source of artillery support for 
Worthington Force during most of 
the day. The British FOO assigned 
to the BCRs was Captain M.A. 
Searle. Upon joining the unit on 
the evening of 8 August, he stated, 
“This regiment looked extremely 
good, very friendly fellows...[who] 
gave me the impression they were 
going to ‘bust the show wide open.’” 
Unfortunately, Searle’s OP tank 
broke down just as the advance was 
starting and he was forced to hitch 
a ride in the tank of Major Carson. 
The wireless was not working in this 
tank, and Searle’s wireless operator, 
Gunner Biggs, found a ride in another 
tank. After arriving at Point 111, 
Searle tried to find a working wireless 
set but each tank he joined was 
knocked out. As a result, Searle 
was unable to contact his regiment 
and the powerful 5.5-inch medium 
guns were never brought to bear 
on the enemy.63 The lack of artillery 
support was not simply a result 
of the battlegroup arriving at the 
wrong objective. This undoubtably 
contributed to the problem but poor 
planning, mistaken deployments 
and a myriad of communication 
difficulties compounded the issue. 
The Worthington Force memorial near 
Point 111. The plaque reads:
IN MEMORIUM
To the soldiers of the 28th Canadian 
Armoured Regiment (The British 
Columbia Regiment) CAC and the 
Algonquin Regiment who, on the 9 
August 1944 in the surrounding area of 
Hill 140 Gave their Lives for Freedom.
GREATER LOVE HATH NO MAN
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These problems would have been 
apparent even if the battlegroup had 
arrived at Point 195 and would have 
resulted in a much weaker artillery 
umbrella than the Canadians were 
used to fighting under.
 Even in  defeat  much was 
accomplished by Worthington 
Force. Having broken through the 
main German line of resistance, the 
battlegroup posed a dire threat to 
the entire German position north 
of Falaise. All available German 
firepower was brought to bear on 
eliminating this threat. This meant 
the destruction of Worthington Force, 
but prevented any other German 
initiative on 9 August.64 It can also 
be argued that the German focus 
on Worthington Force cleared the 
way for the brilliant capture Point 
195 in the early morning hours of 10 
August by the Argyll and Sutherland 
Highlanders of Canada. 
 The ability of Worthington Force 
to last as long as it did without support 
and in the face of concerted and ever 
strengthening German attacks led by 
Panthers and Tigers is a testament 
to the courage and determination of 
Canadian soldiers involved. Allied 
doctrine in the Second World War 
relied on firepower as the cornerstone 
of any operation. The success of the 
7th Canadian Infantry Brigade in 
defending Bretteville-l’Orgueilleuse, 
Norrey-en-Bessin and Putot-en-
Bessin in the days immediately 
following the invasion was as 
much the result of the dominance 
of Canadian artillery as it was the 
bravery of the soldiers of the Regina 
Rifles and Royal Winnipeg Rifles. At 
Point 111 the Canadians had to fight 
a daylong battle without any artillery 
support. If their location had been 
known and artillery support available 
there can be no doubt that today we 
would be celebrating the success of 
Worthington Force. In many ways, 
the battlegroup had accomplished 
the holy grail of Canadian battle 
doctrine when fighting the Germans. 
They had occupied a key piece of 
terrain that was so important to the 
Germans that they would commit 
large reserves to recapture it. The 
advantage should have fallen to 
the Canadians who were fighting 
from prepared positions against 
an enemy that had to come out 
into the open to reach them. This 
battle could have parallelled Arthur 
Currie’s tremendous success at Hill 
70 in 1917.65 Instead, the battlegroup 
did not have the firepower to make 
this happen and Point 111 became 
Canada’s Alamo in Normandy. 
 It did not have to turn out this 
way. Worthington Force was lost 
but there was enough information 
flowing out of the battlegroup to find 
it. While it is true that the battlegroup 
was not where it was supposed to 
be, it should have been possible for 
higher headquarters to locate and 
support the force. There were plenty 
of indicators that could have led to 
the location of the battlegroup, but 
nobody was able to connect the dots 
in a timely manner. With proper 
artillery support and the timely 
arrival of reinforcements the story 
could have been very different.
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